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IN THE COMPLETE TREATISES
OF ST. ANSELM

by

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CHAPTER V

SOME ALLEGED METAPHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Among the many claims made regarding the ontological argument, two stand out as especially in need of analysis. The first is metaphysical: that God's greatness, not His excellence, is the basis of the argument in *Proslogion* 2.[1] The second is psychological: that individual guilt-preoccupation is an essential component in the consciousness which perceives the ontological argument as convincing.[2] In this chapter I shall examine these claims successively and shall comment upon the difference between exegesis and eisogesis.

I

1.1. In an article entitled " 'Greatness' in Anselm's Ontological Argument," R. Brecher writes:

> It is all too often assumed that Anselm used the words 'greater', 'better', and even 'more perfect' interchangeably in his *Proslogion*. I contend that this assumption is based on an insufficiently careful reading of the text, and on insufficient consideration of Anselm's metaphysical background.[3]

Brecher goes on to notice that in *Proslogion* 2-4 "*maius*" occurs fifteen times, whereas "*melius*" occurs only once, viz., in Chapter 3. "God's being *melius* follows from his being the supreme *bonum*," Brecher tells us. "His being the supreme good follows from the fact that every good exists through him, since he made everything else from nothing. And it is because he is the creator, the ground of all being, that he is 'that than whom nothing greater can be thought'. This distinction between God's ontological supremacy and his goodness is retained throughout the *Proslogion*."[4]

Brecher proceeds to make incidental comments about Chapters 9, 13, 15, 18, 22, and 23. These comments aim at reinforcing the claim that Anselm systematically distinguishes between "*maius*" and "*melius*" in the *Proslogion*. Thus, concludes Brecher, by "*maius*"—but not by "*melius*"[5]—Anselm means "ontologically greater."[6] And Brecher construes "ontologically greater" in terms of the notion of degrees of existence[7]—eliciting this construal from *Monologion* 31 in conjunction with the last few sentences of *Proslogion* 3.

Finally, Brecher views Anselm's language in the *Monologion* as so Platonic that "the Theory of Forms springs to mind again in the next paragraph, where Anselm tells us that 'every created being exists in so much the greater degree, or is so much the more excellent, the more like it is to what exists supremely, and is supremely great."[8] The Theory of Forms—having sprung into Brecher's mind—suggests to him Gregory Vlastos' interpretation of Plato's doctrine of degrees of reality. For in a well-known article[9] Vlastos maintains that, for Plato, the Forms are in two respects more real than are particulars: They are cognitively more reliable, and they are more valuable. Brecher applies this interpretation to Anselm's notion of greatness and thereby "shows" the defect of Gaunilo's counter-example of the lost island. For "the phrase 'an island, than which *nothing* greater can be thought' is quite absurd, since there could not possibly be any such island. Something more cognitively reliable and valuable than any possible island can always be conceived."[10]

1.2. At first glance, Brecher's interpretation seems plausible. For, after all, Anselm uses two different words—*"maius*" and "*melius*. " So should we not quite naturally expect that he "was generally careful to distinguish between them"?[11] And must we not chide Hartshorne and Malcolm, and a host of others, who so readily equate the notion of greatness with the notion of perfection? Have not Hartshorne and Malcolm failed to understand the meaning of the formula "that than which nothing *greater* can be thought"? And has not their failure been the result of an "insufficient consideration of Anselm's metaphysical background," as well as the result of "an insufficiently careful reading of the text"?

These are serious charges for Brecher to make. Indeed, if he is

correct, then Hartshorne's exposition of a "logic of perfection" veers away from Anselm, at the very beginning, by conflating two notions which Anselm was generally careful to distinguish. On the other hand, perhaps Brecher moves too hastily to his conclusion. Perhaps he himself has not examined all the texts. As a matter of fact, a careful scrutiny of the texts will show, I submit, that Brecher is the one who is wrong and that interpreters such as Hartshorne and Malcolm can be vindicated.

1.2.1. To begin with, Brecher's survey of the *Proslogion* altogether fails to mention that in two different chapters (*Proslogion* 14 and 18) Anselm uses the phrase "*quo nihil melius cogitari potest*."[12] (And this phrase seems to be a straightforward substitution for "*quo nihil maius cogitari potest*.") Strangely, Brecher completely by-passes Chapter 14 in his rehearsal of Anselm's use of "*melius*." And when he mentions Chapter 18, he ignores mentioning the occurrence of the formula. Instead, he comments:

> In Ch. 18, Anselm says He [*sic*] is life, wisdom, truth, goodness, blessedness, eternity, and every true good—but not that he [*sic*] is greatness. God's greatness is in a different class from his virtues . . . .[13]

But the use of this quotation is misguided. For although Anselm does not in *Proslogion* 18 include greatness in the list of God's *perfections*—a better word than Brecher's word "virtues"—he does include it at the end of *Monologion* 16:

> But obviously the Supreme Nature is supremely whatever good thing it is. Therefore, the Supreme Nature is the Supreme Being, Supreme Life, Supreme Reason, Supreme Security, Supreme Justice, Supreme Wisdom, Supreme Truth, Supreme Goodness, Supreme Greatness, Supreme Beauty, Supreme Immortality, Supreme Incorruptibility, Supreme Immutability, Supreme Beatitude, Supreme Eternity, Supreme Power, Supreme Unity.

Moreover, at the beginning of *Monologion* 17 Anselm again refers to the items on this list as *goods*. Accordingly, when he writes in *Proslogion* 18 "Certainly You are life, wisdom, truth, goodness, blessedness, eternity—You are every true good," we may understand greatness to be among the true goods. So Anselm does *not* systematically classify greatness differently from eternity and truth and wisdom and goodness, etc. Indeed, the passage in *Monologion* 16, together with the fact that Anselm uses both the expression "*quo nihil melius cogitari potest*" and the expres-

sion "*quo nihil maius cogitari potest*," evidences that he regards greatness as a perfection, as a good. I would imagine that in *Proslogion* 5 and 18, and in *Reply to Gaunilo* 10, Anselm omits "greatness" from his list for the same reason that he omits "beauty," "immortality," "incorruptibility," etc.: viz., in order to abbreviate what would otherwise be a very long enumeration.

1.2.2. But there is even more definitive evidence against Brecher's interpretation. For in *Proslogion* 18, where Anselm writes "*quo nihil melius cogitari potest*," the topic of discussion is the indivisibility of God:

> Whatever is composed of parts is not absolutely one but is in a way many and is different from itself and can be divided either actually or conceivably. But these consequences are foreign to You, than whom nothing *better* can be thought.

And this same topic recurs in *De Incarnatione* 4, where now Anselm uses "*maius*":

> If [my opponent] is one of those modern dialecticians who believe that nothing exists except what they can imagine, and if he does not think there to be anything in which there are no parts, at least he will not deny understanding that if there were something which could neither actually nor conceivably be divided, it would be *greater* than something which can be divided at least conceivably.

Similarly, in *Reply to Gaunilo* 1, Anselm uses the word "*maius*" in alluding to the doctrine that what exists as a whole everywhere and at once is greater than what has temporal or spatial parts.

So when we compare these three passages, we see that Anselm's use of "*melius*" in *Proslogion* 18 is no different from his use of "*maius*"[14] "in *De Incarnatione* 4 and *Reply to Gaunilo* 1.

1.2.3. Furthermore, when Anselm comes to instruct Gaunilo on how he can conceive of that than which a *greater* cannot be thought, he does so in terms of conceiving of a hierarchy of *goods*.[15] What exists without end is *better* than what is limited by an end, and thus the former is *greater* than the latter. Brecher himself cites this passage as a counter-example to his own interpretation. But he remarks:

> Since this is the sole example of such a possible failure [to observe the distinction between goodness and greatness] throughout his *Reply*, and since there are grounds for holding that even here the confusion is more apparent than real, I do not think it seriously damaging to the argument. Moreover,

> Anselm's reply to the "Lost Island" counter-example does, as we shall see, tend to confirm it.[16]

Now, this response is bizarre. For this "sole example of a possible failure" is in fact a striking instance of an actual interchange of the notions of goodness and greatness. This example must be given much weight precisely because it is Anselm's *paradigm* of how to conceive of greater and lesser beings—i.e., of more and less perfect beings. Then too, Brecher never presents the alleged "grounds for holding that even here the confusion is more apparent than real." And we cannot help wondering what these might be. Finally, the case of the Lost Island will support Brecher's argument only if "greater" means "cognitively more reliable" or "more valuable." But, as we shall soon see, there is no reason to believe that Anselm's argument trades upon these meanings.

1.2.4. It begins to look as if Brecher's interpretation were tendentious. When he began his article with statistics about the frequency with which Anselm uses "*maius*" and "*melius*" in *Proslogion* 2-4, we received the impression that he had carefully surveyed the use of these words throughout the *Proslogion*. We were therefore surprised to notice both his subsequent failure to mention the phrase "*quo nihil melius cogitari potest*" and his hasty dismissal of the passage in *Reply to Gaunilo* 8. Yet, the culmination of his line of reasoning now forces him to contend that in *Proslogion* 3 Anselm *mistakenly* used "*melius*" instead of "*maius*":

> What, however, of the single occurrence of '*melius*' in Ch. 3? . . . In view of the mass of evidence from the rest of the *Proslogion*, I think it reasonable to conclude that Anselm allowed the notion of *judging* to mislead him into writing *melius* instead of *maius*; this argument as to why God cannot be thought not to exist gains such force as it has, of course, from the notion of the supposed absurdity of creature's *judging* creator, which notion in turn makes clearer sense if applied to the idea of the creature's thinking of something (morally) better, as opposed to something greater, than God, something morally better which the creature could use as a yardstick whereby to judge God.[17]

But, indeed, Anselm has not made a mistake; for in the *Monologion*, the *Proslogion*, and the *Reply to Gaunilo* he is not systematically and generally distinguishing his use of "*maius*" from his use of "*melius*." Instead, he frequently—though not always—uses them interchangeably. And Brecher, who refuses to see this

point, must—to save his argument—claim that Anselm made a linguistic error. One reason behind Brecher's misapprehension is his persistent glossing of "goodness" as "moral goodness." Now, sometimes when Anselm uses "*bonus*" and "*bonitas*" and "*melius*," he does so in a moral sense. In *Proslogion* 9 (S I, 107:10), for instance, "*melior*" means "morally better." By contrast, in *Monologion* 4 (S I, 17:1-2) "*melior*" does *not* mean "morally better." Now, when Anselm alludes to God as "whatever it is better to be than not to be,"[18] he is supposing that all compatible perfections ought to be ascribed to God. And whereas some of these perfections are moral perfections (e.g., truthfulness), some of them are not (e.g., indivisibility).

I do not deny that Brecher realizes that Anselm has a non-moral sense of "*melius*"; but I contend that he over-emphasizes the moral notion of *bonitas* in his discussion of the *Proslogion*. And it is this moral notion which does, in certain respects, stand in contrast to the notion of greatness. However, when Anselm says that God is *quo nihil melius cogitari potest*, he does not limit himself to the notion of morally better—any more than when he says that God is *quo nihil maius cogitari potest*, he excludes from the scope of his phrase such moral attributes as truthfulness.

1.2.5. On the one hand, Brecher is certainly right when he indicates that, for Anselm, "*maius*" signifies "greater" in the sense of "existing in greater degree." For Anselm does indeed teach that what is sentient *exists* more than does what is non-sentient, that what is rational *exists* more than what is non-rational.[19] On the other hand, it is strange for Brecher to introduce Vlastos' interpretation of Plato's doctrine of degrees of reality and to apply this interpretation to Anselm's doctrine in the *Monologion* and the *Proslogion*. Let us remember that Vlastos formulates his interpretation of Plato in the course of denying that Plato believed the Forms to *exist more* than do particulars. Yet, as we have just noticed, Anselm does believe in degrees of *existence*. On the other hand, he does not clearly believe that the truth of God's existence or the truths about God's nature are more cognitively reliable—i.e., are knowable with more certainty—than are various other truths. For in *Reply to Gaunilo* 4 he remarks that "if any one of the things which *most assuredly exist* can be understood not to exist, then likewise other *certainly exist-*

ing things [e.g., God] can also be understood not to exist"—implying that a number of things exist certainly. At any rate, there is no reason to suppose that either the *Proslogion* or the *Reply* makes use of, or at all depends upon, the doctrine that God's existence is cognitively more reliable than are various other objects.[20] And if it makes use -of the notion that God is more valuable than all other objects, it does so in conjunction with the notion that He is more powerful, wise, just, blessed, real, etc., than all other things.

1.2.6. Thus, Brecher's basic claim is false: viz., that in the *Proslogion* Anselm does not use "*maius*" and "*melius*" interchangeably. But, contrary to Brecher's verdict, the reason that Anselm does not hesitate to use these terms interchangeably is that—true to Augustinian metaphysics—he employs a notion of "better" in which a horse can be said to be better than a tree, and what exists without parts can be said to be better than what exists through parts, and so on. Even before looking at the *Proslogion*, we should have been clear about Anselm's interchanging of "*maius*," "*melius*," and "*dignius*." For we should have remembered his comment in *Monologion* 2:

> It follows necessarily that something is supremely great inasmuch as whatever things are great are great through some one thing which is great through itself. I do not mean great in size, as is a material object; but I mean great in the sense that the greater (*maius*) anything is the better (*melius*) or more excellent (*dignius*) it is—as in the case of wisdom.

And we should already have been aware from *Monologion* 4 that Anselm finds it easy to write:

> *Quare non sic sunt magnae, ut* illis nihil sit maius aliud. *Quod si nec per hoc quod sunt, nec per aliud possibile est tales esse plures naturas* quibus nihil sit praestantius, *nullo modo possunt esse naturae plures huiusmodi.*

Moreover, *Monologion* 4 gives clear witness to Anselm's tendency to say "*naturae meliores*" in place of "*naturae maiores*"—even though these very phrases do not occur there.

To say that Anselm sometimes interchanges " *maius*" and " *melius*" is not to say that he regards them as generally synonymous. Since greatness is a quantity and goodness a quality, it would be astounding if " greater" had the same definition as " better," or if " great" had the same definition as " good." Presumably, Anselm would agree with Augustine that " not ev-

erything which is great is good, inasmuch as there are also great evils."[21] Though "*bonus*" and "*magnus*" are not, *tout court*, synonymous, they can be used as substitutes for each other in specific contexts.[22] In the *Monologion* and the *Proslogion* Anselm permits himself this substitutability because of his metaphysical doctrine that every being is a good thing and that every good thing is a being.[23] This doctrine allows him to compare beings and to judge that some of them are better than others.[24] And if one thing is better than another, it is more excellent (*praestantius*) than that other.[25] And if it is more excellent, it is also (in one sense) greater.

Hartshorne and Malcolm are therefore right in interpreting Anselm's use of "that than which nothing greater can be thought"—in the context of the *Proslogion*—as encompassing "that than which nothing more excellent can be thought," "that than which nothing more real can be thought."[26] At places, then, Anselm takes the contextual meaning of these phrases to be the same, even though the phrases are not synonymous. In a similar way, the verb "*cogitare*" is broader in signification than is the verb "*intelligere*." And yet Anselm feels no more hesitancy over using "*intelligere*" in place of "*cogitare*"[27] than he does over using "*melius*" in place of "*maius*."

Brecher has tried to insist that Anselm's use of terms is more systematic than in fact it is. As a result, he has passed from exegesis into eisogesis. To "find" in Anselm's writings rigid meanings of terms turns out to be an illusory finding, except in those cases where Anselm gives explicit definitions ("truth," "justice," "freedom"). We have seen how Brecher, in his insistence upon rigidity, ends up insisting that in *Proslogion* 3 Anselm mistakenly wrote "*melius*" where he should have written "*maius*." Only by this move can he make Anselm's terminology come out "consistently." The problem, however, is that Brecher has misconceived the ideal of consistency in the domain of ordinary language. For consistent use is not the same as uniform use. Hence, the fact that Anselm uses "*melius*" in a moral sense in *Proslogion* 9 is not inconsistent with his using it in a non-moral sense in *Proslogion* 18. And the fact that, in general, "*maius*" has more different uses than does "*melius*" does not prevent their uses from sometimes coinciding in a given context.

II

In "God, Guilt, and Logic: the Psychological Basis of the Ontological Argument" Lewis Feuer maintains that the ontological argument—in one form or another—appears convincing only to philosophers of a certain emotional temperament. And when he sets out to identify this temperament, he quite naturally does so by casting a glance at the lives[28] (or at least the comments) of some better-known defenders of the argument. Thus, after examining the writings of Anselm of Canterbury, Josiah Royce, Karl Barth, and Norman Malcolm, he finds that they "all shared a common concern with the experience of individual guilt. . . . This component of guilt-preoccupation is an essential one in the consciousness which perceives the ontological argument as convincing. It is the source of a mode of thinking which might be called 'logical masochism'. To assuage guilt, the ontologian is prepared in all humility to bow his logical powers submissively before an entity which is transcendentally exceptional to them."[29]

In the remainder of this chapter I shall analyze only one aspect of Feuer's article: viz., the claims made about the life and mind of St. Anselm.

2.1. Feuer alleges that Anselm "struggles to find a convincing proof of God's existence" in order "to overcome his own doubts." "In his own doubt, Anselm cried: 'Lord, if thou art not here, where shall I seek thee, being absent?' His own personal guilt tormented him: 'My iniquities have gone over my head, they overwhelm me; and, like a heavy load, they weigh me down. Free me from them; unburden me, that the pit of iniquities may not close over me.'"[30] Now, in maintaining that Anselm sought after his renowned proof of God's existence in order to overcome his doubts, Feuer goes against the textual evidence. For in the *Proslogion* Anselm presents himself as a believer who is seeking to understand. Indeed, this is the implication of the original title "*Fides quaerens intellectum*." Similarly, in *De Libertate Arbitrii* 3 Anselm puts into the mouth of the Student the words: "I believe, but I desire to understand." And in *Cur Deus Homo* I, 3 he has Boso remark that unlike those who seek a rational basis because they do not believe, we seek it because we do believe.[31]

Moreover, in *De Incarnatione* 1 he admonishes: "No Christian ought to question the truth of what the Catholic Church believes in its heart and confesses with its mouth. Rather, by holding constantly and unhesitatingly to this faith, by loving it and living according to it he ought humbly, and as best he is able, to seek to discover the reason why it is true." So Anselm's general program is to seek reasons not in order to overcome his doubts but in order to satisfy his understanding.

Of course, it is possible for even a believer to have doubts. So perhaps what Feuer would say is that while struggling to formulate the ontological proof, Anselm—though still a believer—was disquieted by doubts. "I believe. 0 Lord, help Thou mine unbelief" might have been his prayer. Well, indeed, it *might* have been. But we have no evidence that in fact it was. In the preface to the *Proslogion* there is no sign of personal or of philosophical doubt. Nor does Anselm repudiate the arguments and the conclusions which he had already presented in the *Monologion*. These arguments were meant to be doubt-excluding. After finishing the *Monologion*, Anselm began to have doubts not about the existence of God but about finding a *single, simplified* line of reasoning which would establish both the existence and the attributes of God. For the arguments in the *Monologion* had been more complex and numerous than he had thought desirable.

Furthermore, none of the statements in *Proslogion* 1 *evidence* a state of psychological doubt in Anselm. The question "If You are not here, Lord, where shall I seek You in Your absence?" does not arise out of personal doubt, as Feuer supposes. It is rather preparatory to Anselm's later explanation (in *Proslogion* 15 and 16) of how God can be present everywhere even though remaining in inaccessible light. So too, the beseeching lament

> Having mounted above my head, my iniquities cover me over; and as a heavy burden they weigh me down

does not show that at this time Anselm was undergoing " an intense experience of guilt."[32] Anselm is here alluding to Psalms 37:5 (38:4); and, in fact, throughout *Proslogion* 1 he is writing in a stylized way. His style is similar to Augustine's elevated language in the *Confessions*. By making use of the contrasting motifs of darkness-light, sin-forgiveness,

poverty-richness, hunger-fullness, turmoil-rest, burdened-unburdened, Anselm is adopting a literary form—not keeping a diary of his personal dispositions at a given moment. Feuer makes a genre-mistake. And this mistake invalidates his exegesis.

Not only does Feuer (1) misinterpret Anselm's doubt as being about the existence of God, and (2) misconstrue Anselm's lamentation as revealing intense guilt-preoccupation, but he also (3) misreads Anselm's acceptance of the ontological argument as "a capitulation of logical masochism."[33] For, in order to assuage guilt, thinks Feuer, Anselm humbly bowed his logical powers. But, indeed, what is the true significance of Anselm's autobiographical account?:

> At last, despairing, I wanted to give up my pursuit of an argument which I supposed could not be found. But when I wanted to shut out the very thought [of such an argument], lest by engaging my mind in vain, it would keep me from other projects in which I could make headway—just then this argument began more and more to force itself insistently upon me, unwilling and resisting as I was. Then one day when I was tired as a result of vigorously resisting its entreaties, what I had despaired of finding appeared in my strife-torn mind in such way that I eagerly embraced the reasoning I had been anxiously warding off.[34]

Is it not clear that this account does not indicate the presence of any so-called logical masochism? Anselm is not intimating that he abandoned his logical powers in order to embrace what he was weary of thinking about. Instead, his remarks show just the opposite. In the course of trying to formulate a new argument he kept finding flaws in his various formulations. After a time he supposed that there was no way to formulate a valid version of the argument—whose invalid or incomplete versions he had been resisting. Then one day he struck upon a formulation—this is the meaning of "what I had despaired of finding appeared in my strife-torn mind"—whose logic seemed to him so cogent that he could no longer rationally resist it. He, therefore, eagerly embraced it.

In the foregoing passage Anselm is, once again, making use of a literary form: He is treating an argument as something transcendent to its different formulations; and he is depicting it in the guise of an importunate idea which seeks a domicile in his mind. But Feuer, who does not discern the literary form, believes that

Anselm is referring to a single argument-version, or a single set of thoughts, which kept haunting him—so that finally, being weary of it, he simply surrendered to it. And having once accepted it, he never again questioned it—even though later he was no longer weary.

2.2. Feuer's three misrepresentations of Anselm's texts illustrate how careful an interpreter must be in examining not only what Anselm has said but also the form in which he has said it. For a mistake about the genre may well result in a mistake about the meaning. Ironically, when we become aware of some of Feuer's other claims about Anselm, we begin to be more concerned about Feuer's *idée fixe* than about Anselm's alleged *masochisme logique*. "No philosophical system," Feuer contends, "has made guilt so central in its notion of the universe as did Anselm's."[35] What in the world—we are led immediately to wonder—warrants this startling assertion? After all, Anselm does not pay any special attention to guilt in his philosophical works the *Monologion*, *De Grammatico*, *De Veritate*, and *De Libertate*. Moreover, even in *De Casu Diaboli* and *De Concordia*, where the theme of the Fall and the theme of grace are (respectively) more prominent, there is no distinctive preoccupation with guilt. Were it the case that by "Anselm's philosophical system," Feuer meant to distinguish Anselm's philosophical from his theological system, then his claim would be patently false. But he means, instead, both the philosophical and the theological aspects of Anselm's thought, taken as a whole. Yet, even from a theological viewpoint, Anselm's thought is not distinctive in making guilt central to the notion of the universe. For, in a sense, the whole movement of Christian orthodox theology emphasizes the centrality of this notion. And surely Augustine and Jonathan Edwards are candidates more deserving of Feuer's label than is Anselm. Indeed, some of Anselm's own opponents surpassed him in emphasizing human depravity. For they taught—and Anselm denied—that original sin in infants is aggravated by the sins of their more recent ancestors, and thus is greater than Adam's first sin.[36] So what is the *textual* basis underlying Feuer's claim? It is, Feuer implies, the entire *Cur Deus Homo*:

> For man's guilt is the cardinal metaphysical fact, according to Anselm, from which the details of the Universal Drama necessarily follow. Anselm indeed

> professed to prove with deductive logic the necessity of the Incarnation and Atonement of Jesus. The logical steps, to his mind, were simple and rigorous. Man, in his disobedience, had committed a sin which was infinite; to atone for an infinite guilt, no finite sacrifice could be adequate; therefore God Himself had to become Man, so that an Infinite Atonement of Infinite Guilt could be achieved; therefore Jesus had become Man and was crucified. We may omit some of the intervening corollaries in the deduction; such in its essentials was Anselm's theology of guilt which became known in the history of theology as the 'satisfaction doctrine'. In its time, it represented a new departure in the theory of Man's Redemption. For us, it is remarkable for its projection on a cosmic scale of its central metaphysical notion of man's guilt. This is the mythology, above all, of guilt-consciousness.[37]

There are four troublesome features about this interpretation. First of all, the satisfaction-theory is no more cosmic in scope than is the Devil-ransom theory it replaced. Secondly, as already noted, the doctrine of original sin and original guilt is scarcely distinctive to Anselm. Thirdly, Anselm does not teach that God (in an unrestricted sense) became Man (in an unrestricted sense); he teaches that God in the person of the Son became a man, viz., the man Jesus. Finally, the notions of infinite sin and infinite guilt need more precision. For in one important sense Anselm does *not* maintain that Adam's sin and guilt were infinite. Indeed, the *Cur Deus Homo* has two different senses of "infinite sin"; and we are obliged not to conflate them. In *Cur Deus Homo* I, 21 Boso admits: "Even for the sake of preserving the whole of creation, it is not the case that I ought to do something which is contrary to the will of God." And in his very next speech he says: "If there were an infinitely multiple number of worlds and they too were exhibited to me, I would still give the same answer." Anselm then reasons that the satisfaction must be in proportion to the extent of the sin, and that therefore the sinner is required to pay "something greater than is that for whose sake you ought not to have sinned." That is, the sinner must pay something which is greater than everything other than God.[38]

Now, in *Cur Deus Homo* II, 14 Boso does refer to the above-mentioned sin as infinite: "I ask you now to teach me how His death outweighs the number and the magnitude of *all* sins—seeing that you have shown *one* sin which we regard as trifling to be so *infinite* that if an infinite number of worlds were exhibited, each as full of creatures as is our world, and if these worlds could be kept from being reduced to nothing only on the condition that

someone would take a single look contrary to the will of God, this look ought, nonetheless, not to be taken." But this sin is *not infinite in magnitude*. It is "infinite" only in the sense that it ought not to be done even in order to save an infinite *multitude* of finite worlds from perishing. In other words, it is so grave that its evil outweighs the good of an infinity of worlds, each like our own.

By contrast, there is a sin which Anselm regards as, in principle, infinite in magnitude: viz., an injury knowingly done to the physical life of the God-man. For it would be a sin immediately against the person of God. Now, if this sin were done knowingly—something Anselm says could not happen—it would surpass immeasurably the collective gravity of all other conceivable sins. Thus, this sin would be the greatest conceivable sin. In II, 15 Anselm calls it *illud infinitum peccatum*.[39] And in II, 14 he reasons that "if every good is as good as its destruction is evil, then [His life] is a good incomparably greater than the evil of those sins which His being-put-to-death immeasurably surpasses." Therefore, His life (which is so great a good) can pay for infinitely more sins than the sins of the entire world.

So Anselm holds that some sins are greater or lesser than others. Thus, Adam's personal sin was greater than is an infant's original sin, of which Adam's sin is the cause.[40] And Adam's sin is less than Satan's sin; for Adam sinned being tempted by another, whereas Satan sinned unabetted.[41] But Adam's sin is not *illud infinitum peccatum*. For no one's sin can actually be as great as is conceivable. And since after Adam sinned, his will retained some measure of justice,[42] his sin was not, strictly speaking, infinite in magnitude. It was infinite—to repeat—only in the sense that it ought not to have been committed even in order to save an infinite multitude of worlds. Similarly, Adam's *guilt* both is and is not infinite, depending upon the sense of "infinite."

Feuer does not make these distinctions. Thus, he gives the impression that the merit of Christ's death is infinite in the same sense as the merit of Adam's sin, except that the former is positive merit, whereas the latter is negative merit (= demerit). But in fact, the infinity of Christ's merit infinitely surpasses the *finitude* of Adam's demerit—even though Adam's demerit ought not to have occurred even for the sake of saving an infinite number of

(finite) worlds. These distinctions are important, because without them Anselm's theory would immediately collapse. For were his theory saddled with only one sense of "infinity," Christ's infinite merit could not be thought to counter-weigh more than the infinitude of Adam's sin alone.[43] Accordingly, it would not be sufficient to outweigh the sins of Adam's descendants as well. So in over-simplifying these distinctions Feuer does a disservice to Anselm's theology, without ever thereby proving that Anselm's theology is more guilt-oriented than is Augustine's or Jonathan Edwards'—without ever proving that "no philosophical system has made guilt so central in its notion of the universe as did Anselm's."

2.3. Besides not doing justice to Anselm's texts, Feuer's analysis in other respects betrays special pleading. For example, Feuer attempts to accentuate Anselm's personal sense of guilt by insinuating that he had "a strong maternal fixation,"[44] which conduced to guilt-feelings. Among the evidence offered for fixation is one of Anselm's prayers in which Christ is represented as a mother: " 'And Thou, Jesus, dear Lord, art Thou not a mother too?… Indeed, Thou art, and the mother of all mothers, who didst taste death in Thy longing to bring forth children unto life.' "[45] Perhaps if there were extensive evidence (from Anselm's biographer or from Anselm's own writings) of mother-fixation, the citing of the prayer might contribute to a total pattern of evidence and, hence, might be given some credence. But in the absence of supplementary support, the prayer by itself carries not even circumstantial weight. Of course, Feuer has not produced the supplementary evidence. The few other data that he alludes to are—both singularly and collectively—flimsy. Strangely, he does not at all entertain the hypothesis that Anselm, in his prayer, is using a theologically legitimated locution. Even Augustine had said, in effect, that *Deus mater est, quia fovet et nutrit et lactat et continet*.[46] The usual expression was to speak of the Church as our mother, as Anselm does at the end of *De Conceptu Virginali*. But there was nothing theologically bizarre about referring to God as mother. The Old Testament prophet had himself portrayed God as a mother bringing forth children and comforting.[47] And in the New Testament Jesus had likened himself unto a mother-hen gathering her chickens under her wings.[48]

Feuer fails to mention that in *Monologion* 42 Anselm states explicitly that the Supreme Spirit is more suitably called father than mother. And this statement is repeated at the end of *De Incarnatione Verbi*. So in Anselm's works there is no obsession with the image of God or of Jesus as mother. Accordingly, the mere fact that in one prayer Anselm uses mother-imagery is of no consequence for establishing fixation. Feuer's inference is as non sequitur as would be the inference that the author of the book of Job was psychotic because he wrote: "I have said to rottenness: Thou art my father: to worms, My mother and my sister."[49] Once again, Feuer has taken no cognizance of the fact that prayers and meditations are stylized forms of writing. Moreover, within Christianity these literary forms are as much under the influence of a continuing tradition as they are products of the unconscious recesses of a single individual's psyche.

Last of all, Feuer is undiscerning in his use of secondary sources. For he blithely draws upon Martin Rule's biography of St. Anselm[50] without scrutinizing it carefully. Now, we must place Rule not among the "scientific" historians but among the romantics, among those who believe that historical narrative must read like a novel, those who in the name of historical imagination interject their purely personal fancy. This judgment about Rule's work will be readily apparent to anyone who takes the trouble to check the narrative against its sources. But this verdict will be obvious even more quickly to one who takes a minute to examine his footnotes. So let us take those few seconds for a closer look at three sample passages.

The first passage is found on pp. 104-105, where Rule is discussing a disputed sentence in Eadmer:

> And, if it be not hypercritical to interpret Eadmer's phrase, as meaning that Anselm's journey was not so much one journey as two, the second sudden in its beginning as the first had been sudden in its ending, the interpretation is *justified* by the obvious reflection that he can scarcely have reached the borders of Normandy before the terrible news of the interdict arrested him like a 'shadow of eclipse,' and Normandy was, for the present, forbidden ground.[51]

In his footnote Rule adds: "This is, of course, conjectural; for the precise date of the interdict is not known." So Rule envisions himself as "justifying" an interpretation by means of a *conjecture*. And this way of reasoning reveals that his notion of historical justification is anything but rigorous.

A second passage is equally revelatory:

> In those days the Seine at Rouen, taking its tortuous course further to the north than now, washed the very precinct of the metropolitan church; and it requires but little effort of imagination to see the Prior of Le Bec and his pupil putting off in a ferry on the morrow of their interview with the Archbishop from close under the sacred pile, and slowly making for the southern bank of the river.[52]

In the footnote we read: "I frankly own that on revising these pages for the press I cannot find an authority for the suggestion that there was no bridge across the Seine at Rouen in the spring of 1060. I have no proof either way. So, *quod scripsi scripsi*." This note evidences that Rule's imagination is roaming freely, rather than being determined by the data. In effect, his attitude seems to be: "Lanfranc and Anselm had to cross the river. It is of no historical significance whether they crossed by bridge or by ferry. So in the absence of any evidence one way or the other, the historian is free to construct his narrative along probabilistic lines. (It is not, for example, likely that they swam across.) If there was a bridge, then in all likelihood they would have used it; if there was no bridge, then there would have been a ferry, etc. The historian, in his narrative, must get Lanfranc and Anselm across the river. Yet, for the historian to write 'probably' or 'in all likelihood' or 'presumably' or 'I surmise that' before each of his interpolations would make the narrative read clumsily. Besides, the reader already understands that these qualifications obtain. The historian will, to be sure, sometimes caution his reader about the lacunae in the data, as I am now doing; but he cannot be expected to do so in every case."

Now, if this account—or something like it—summarizes Rule's attitude and corresponding practice, then he has veered from the conception of history as *Wissenschaft*. R. G. Collingwood, for instance, was later to discourse about the historical imagination and was himself to insist that the historian must interpolate between the data in order to weave a coherent narrative. (This interpolation helps to distinguish history from chronicle.) The record says that Caesar's army moved from city A to city B in C number of days. The historian, knowing the route and the physical capability of the men, will infer that the army moved by forced marches, that it therefore arrived weary, etc.[53] Collingwood's point is that the scientific historian will make the inference which the consistent use of the data *necessitates*. He

will not interject into his narrative anything arbitrary. Yet, in Rule's biography we are struck by how often he says what there is neither evidence nor need for saying. Why are we told about the tortuous Seine washing the precincts of the metropolitan church and about the ferry moving slowly toward the southern bank? The main reason, I suggest, is Rule's commitment to writing *vivid* history, to creating a mood of romance with the past. This commitment leads him to over-specify; and in moments of self-reproach, he simply adds a footnote.

A third passage displays how inveterate is Rule's tendency to over-specify: "The monks of Le Bec, some hundred and twenty in number, were seated round about their chapter house."[54] Here the footnote reads: "Not more, I should say, than a hundred and twenty. A hundred and thirty-seven names had been inscribed since the establishment of the house; and by this time there had certainly been thirteen removals, whether by death, preferment, or emigration, and there may, of course, have been a few more." In short, Rule does not know exactly how many monks there were; but he cannot resist placing the number at one hundred and twenty—give or take a few.

Once we recognize how free Rule's narrative is, we will be cautious about relying upon it uncritically. Yet, Feuer, who does not seem to be aware of Rule's method, uses the narrative incautiously. "We know," asserts Feuer confidently, "that for Anselm, the inventor of the ontological argument, mortification was the chief joy almost all his life."[55] Feuer's authority for this confident assertion is Rule's biography. But as found in Rule, the corresponding remark is simply another instance of imaginative interpolation. "And hence," writes Rule, "when in old age he [viz., Anselm] reviewed his mortal career, it was not without regret that he pointed to one period of it in which the intensity of his desire for the religious profession was allowed to relax; to one short interval in which, *mortification not being his sole joy*, he suffered his heart's barque—to use his own phrase—to ride indolently at anchor and run risk of drifting out to the open sea."[56] Now, Rule's own source—viz., Eadmer's *De Vita et Conversatione Anselmi Canturariensis Archiepiscopi*—does not so much as intimate that Anselm's sole joy was mortification.[57] One danger, then, of Rule's method is that it can result in a narrative that misleads people like Feuer. (For in the present

passage Rule does not include the occasional footnote which expresses his reservations.) Correspondingly, one shortcoming of Feuer's analysis is that it borrows uncritically from Rule's history.

So Feuer is not alert to the difference between historical romance and scientific history, just as also he is not attuned to the various differences of literary genre. Yet, not only does he make use of historical fiction, he even misuses it by misreading it. In particular, he misreads Rule's reproduction—embellished reproduction, to be sure—of Eadmer's report of Anselm's boyhood dream:

Eadmer's Account

. . . it happened one night that he saw a vision, in which he was bidden to climb to the top of the mountain and hasten to the court of the great king, God. But then, before he began to climb, he saw in the plain through which he was approaching the foot of the mountain, women—serfs of the king—who were reaping the corn, but doing so carelessly and idly. The boy was grieved and indignant at their laziness, and resolved to accuse them before their lord the king. Then he climbed the mountain and came to the royal court, where he found God alone with his steward. For, as he imagined, since it was autumn he had sent his household to collect the harvest. The boy entered and was summoned by the Lord. He approached and sat at his feet. The Lord asked him in a pleasant and friendly way who he was, where he came from and what he wanted. He replied to the question as best he could. Then, at God's command, the whitest of bread was brought him by the steward, and he refreshed himself with it in God's presence. The next day therefore, when he recalled to his mind's eye all that he had seen, like a simple and innocent boy he be-

Rule's Account

. . . one night as he slept the summons came. He must climb the mountain and hasten to the Court of God. He set forth, crossed the river, scaled the Gargantua, where, grieved at finding the King's maidens gathering in His harvest after too careless and too indolent a fashion, he chid their sloth and resolved to lay charge against them, but passed on forthwith; for he must not delay. So, leaving the region of corn and vineyard, he plunged into the forest, and, threading his way upwards through belts of pine and over lawns of turf and lavender, and scaling precipitous blank rocks, had already reached the summit, when lo! heaven opened. The Invisible, in fashion as a king, sat before him, throned in majesty, and with none near Him but His seneschal, for the rest of the household had been sent down into the world to reap His harvest. The child crossed the threshold; the Lord called him, and he obeyed; he approached, and sat down at the Lord's feet; was asked with royal grace and condescension who he was, whence he had come, what he wanted; answered the questions, and was not afraid. Whereupon the King gave command to the

> lieved that he had been in heaven and that he had been fed with the bread of God, and he asserted as much to others in public.[58]
>
> seneschal, who brought forth bread and set before him. It was bread of an exceeding whiteness; and he ate it in the Lord's presence. He ate it and was refreshed, and slept his sleep, and awoke next morning at Aosta, and, remembering his journey, or, rather, not so much remembering it, as retracing it step by step, and incident by incident, flew to his mother's knee, and told her all.[59]

Feuer, in the course of psychoanalyzing this dream, states: "The careless King, disporting with maidens, is the earthly harsh father,[60] so unkind to the mother. . . ."[61] Yet, it is clear from Eadmer's report, which is faithfully (though more fancifully) restated by Rule, that the King is not disporting with the maidens. Nor is anyone at all disporting with them. Nor is the King called careless. Feuer has simply misread the record. Once we correct his error, we see that his particular psychoanalytic interpretation loses even the tenuous basis it may previously have seemed to possess.

In sum, Feuer has produced no evidence for his psychological interpretation of Anselm's life and argument. He has not shown that Anselm's life is distinguished by excessive preoccupation with guilt. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he has not proved that Anselm's excessive feelings of guilt explain his having formulated and accepted the argument of *Proslogion* 2.

3. *Conclusion*. Both Feuer and Brecher become entangled in the same general mistake: They approach Anselm's texts literalistically instead of literarily. This latter approach respects the different literary forms—treating historical narrative as historical narrative, prayer as prayer, figure-of-speech as figure-of-speech. By contrast, the former procedure tries stubbornly to read-off a surface meaning, irrespective of the attending genre. Accordingly, as soon as Feuer grasps a surface meaning, he adorns it in the garb of psychoanalytic theory, and exhibits its titillating aspects. Brecher, on the other hand, assumes that because—literalistically *viewed*—"*melius*" and "*maius*" are not synonymous, Anselm does not at all use them interchangeably in the *Proslogion*. Thereby Brecher fails to detect that the inter-

changeability, which really occurs, serves not only a metaphysical end but also the literary end of relieving monotony.

Sometimes people have spoken as if Anselm—Abbot of Bec and Archbishop of Canterbury—had no concern for literary style. They ignore his attempts at humor in his dialogues, his puns in the *Monologion*, his personification of the members and the senses in *De Conceptu Virginali* 4, his overall care to avoid the inelegant repetition of a word, his acceptance of the natural "imprecisions" of ordinary language, his vivid imagery in his meditations, and the proper forms of deference and humility in his letters. Still, we must not exaggerate. For the fact remains that, on the whole, his style is plain and unembellished. And so one would not expect that his terminology could be mistaken for technical or that his quotation of the Psalms could be construed as autobiography. Yet, we have just witnessed with what apparent ease such errors come to be made.

Thus, it is true that in Brecher and in Feuer exegesis gives way to eisogesis. But, in last analysis, each of these philosophers is tacitly giving vent to a legitimate protest. Feuer is rightly upset with those who, like Nicholas Rescher, articulate a special sense of "follow" in which God's existence is then said to follow from the definition of the term "God."[62] And he is rightly resisting the interpretations of those[63] who, like Karl Barth and A. Stolz, view Anselm as emphasizing the religious significance—more than the logic—of his *Proslogion* argument. Similarly, Brecher is implicitly protesting against Anselm's failure to develop a sophisticated metaphysic, a more extensive set of conceptual distinctions, and a special philosophical nomenclature. In these respects he would be right to exalt Aquinas over Anselm. Moreover, he correctly senses the irony involved in Anselm's supposing that he had presented to the world a "simplified" line of reasoning in *Proslogion* 2. For the controversies about what Anselm may have meant—or, at least, ought to have meant—will continue into the centuries. Brecher keenly suspects that much of the futility of the controversy could have been prevented had Anselm distinguished, clarified, specified, and even metaphysicized, more than he did.

With these fundamental insights and protests I can only agree.

ABBREVIATIONS

Anselm's Works

M	*Monologion* (A Soliloquy)
P	*Proslogion* (An Address)
DG	*De Grammatico*
DV	*De Veritate* (On Truth)
DL	*De Libertate Arbitrii* (Freedom of Choice)
DCD	*De Casu Diaboli* (The Fall of the Devil)
DIV	*Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi* (The Incarnation of the Word)
CDH	*Cur Deus Homo* (Why God Became a [God]-man)
DCV	*De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato* (The Virgin Conception and Original Sin)
DP	*De Processione Spiritus Sancti* (The Procession of the Holy Spirit)
DC	*De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio* (The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice)
PF	*Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury* (Philosophical Fragments). Latin text ed. F. S. Schmitt and published in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie and Theologie des Mittelalters*, 33/3. (Münster: Aschendorff Press, 1936)

Other Works

DT	Augustine's *De Trinitate* (On the Trinity) E.g., DT 7.4.7 indicates Book 7, Chapter 4, Section 7
PL	*Patrologia Latina* (ed. J. P. Migne)
AA	*Analecta Anselmiana* (Frankfurt/M.: Minerva GmbH). Vol. I (1969); Vol. II (1970); Vol. III (1972); Vol. IV (1975); Vol. V (1976). Vols. I-III ed. F. S. Schmitt; Vols. IV-V ed. Helmut Kohlenberger. A continuing series.
S	*Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia*. Ed. F. S. Schmitt. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons). 6 Vols. (1946 – 1961). Vol. I first published in Seckau, 1938; Vol. II first published in Rome, 1940. All volumes reprinted by Friedrich Frommann Press (Stuttgart, 1968) with an introduction by Schmitt drawing together his articles on Anselm's text, and with corrigenda for the text.

NOTES

Chapter V: Some Alleged Metaphysical and Psychological Aspects of the Ontological Argument

1. R. Brecher, " ' Greatness' in Anselm's Ontological Argument," *Philosophical Quarterly*, 24 (April 1974), p. 103.

2. Lewis S. Feuer, "God, Guilt, and Logic: The Psychological Basis of the Ontological Argument," *Inquiry*, 2 (Autumn 1968), p. 259.

3. Brecher, p. 97.

4. Brecher, p. 98.

5. Re "*melius*", note the following comments of Brecher: (1) "In Ch. 9, Anselm discusses God's moral goodness, his *bonitas* . . ." (p. 98); (2) ". . . the idea of the creature's thinking of something (morally) better, as opposed to something greater . . ." (p. 98); (3) "Hitler could not be better or worse than King Arthur, since the latter, being nonexistent, could have no moral qualities at all attaching to him" (p. 99); (4) "If it [viz., 'rnore perfect'] means simply 'better', that is, 'morally better', then that, as we have seen, solves nothing" (p. 100).

6. Brecher, p. 103.

7. Brecher, p. 102.

8. *Loc. cit*.

9. "Degrees of Reality in Plato," in *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, ed. Renford Bambrough (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 1-19.

10. Brecher, pp. 104-105.

11. Brecher, p. 97.

12. P 14 (S I, 111:9) and P 18 (S I, 114:21-22).

13. Brecher, p. 98.

14. N.B. In M 2 Anselm states that only what is supremely good can be supremely great. Because of this metaphysical view he can interchange talk about God's goodness with talk about His greatness—even though "great" and "good" have different definitions. By "God's goodness" Anselm signifies both God's moral perfections and His non-moral perfections.

15. *Reply to Gaunilo* 8.

16. Brecher, p. 99.

17. Brecher, p. 98.

18. E.g., in P 5.

19. M 31.

20. It is not clearly the case, for example, that (for Anselm) God's existence is cognitively more reliable than the truth that something has existed in the past. But even if Anselm would have asserted such a greater reliability, his argument in *Proslogion* 2 does not depend upon or employ such a premise.

21. Ep. 204 (PL 33:941).

22. Similarly, "*oratio*" and "*enuntiatio*" are not synonymous. But Anselm uses them interchangeably in DV 2. Boethius distinguishes five different kinds of *oratio*—of which *oratio enuntiativa* is one. See PL 64:296C.

23. Note DCD 1.

24. See pp. 33-34 of my Ch. II above.

25. Note M 4 (S I, 17:1-2), where Anselm interchanges "*melior*" and "*praestantior*." Jonathan Barnes is wrong in asserting flatly that Anselm construes greatness as moral goodness (*The Ontological Argument*, p. 82).

26. See Sylvia Crocker's interesting article "The Ontological Significance of Anselm's *Proslogion*," *Modern Schoolman*, 50 (November 1972), 33-56. Crocker, who believes that in P 2-4 "greater" properly means "more real," recognizes that it does not bear this one meaning throughout the *Proslogion*. However, I deem it more accurate to say that in P 2-4 "greater" *includes* the meaning "more real." For it also includes the meanings "more excellent," "more perfect," "ontologically better": A being which exists both in the understanding and in reality is a more excellent *being* than it would be if it existed only in the understanding. (In this respect, it is also a more perfect being, a better being.) Perhaps Crocker would concede this point; for later she switches from saying "the proper meaning" (p. 33) to saying the "primary meaning" (p. 35).

Note M 36, where Anselm teaches that a being exists more truly (really) outside the human mind than it exists in our knowledge. M 31 shows that Anselm links degrees of existence and degrees of excellence. Thus, there is a sense in which, according to the *Monologion*, a being that exists outside the human mind is both a more real being and a more excellent being than its "likeness" in our mind—as strange as either of these comparisons may seem to us. (And to me they seem equally strange.) Similarly, in P 2 Anselm's argument is formulated in terms of an ontology where degrees of reality and degrees of excellence are exactly correlated to each other. By using the phrase "*aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest*," Anselm captures both the notion of *res quae magis est* and the notion of *res quae praestantior est*.

27. Note Ch. 1, pp. 1-2 above.

28. "An emotional base underlying a mode of philosophical argument is, of course, best grasped in the complexities of the philosopher's personal life" (Feuer, p. 259).

29. Feuer, p. 259.

30. Feuer, pp. 260-261. His quotations are from P 1.

31. Note also the end of CDH II, 13, where Boso says: "Although I did not doubt that this was always the case with Christ, nevertheless I asked to hear the reason for it. For often we are certain that something is the case but nevertheless do not know how to prove it rationally."

32. Feuer: "It was precisely during an intense experience of guilt that Anselm's logical resistances gave way, and he yielded to the validity of the onotological argument" (p. 260).

33. Feuer, p. 261.

34. *Proslogion* Preface.

35. Feuer, p. 260.

36. See DCV 24.

37. Feuer, p. 260.

38. Cf. *Meditatio* III (S III, 86:75 ff.). N.B. John McIntyre, "Cur Deus-Homo: The Axis of the Argument," in *Sola Ratione* (ed. Helmut Kohlenberger. Stuttgart: F. Frommann Press, 1970), 111-118. [Also note McIntyre's insight about how to translate the title "*Cur Deus Homo*." See *St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo* (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1954), p. 117.]

39. S II, 115:17-18.

40. DCV 26.

41. CDH I, 22.

42. DCV 24.

43. Anselm does not distinguish orders of infinity as does a post-Cantorian mathematician. In DIV 15 he does, however, remark that an eternity together with an eternity would still be one eternity, just as a point together with a point would still be one point. Note Boso's first question in CDH II, 15.

44. Feuer, p. 260.

45. *Loc. cit*. See *Oratio* 10 (S III, 40:197 ff.). Feuer quotes this paraphrase from M. J. Charlesworth, *St. Anselm's Proslogion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 16.

46. *Exposition of Ps.* 26.2.18 (PL 36:208).

47. Isa. 66:9: "Shall not I that make others to bring forth children, myself bring forth, saith the Lord? Shall I, that give generation to others be barren, saith the Lord thy God?" (Douay version). Isa. 66:13: "As one whom the mother caresseth, so will I comfort you: and you shall be comforted in Jerusalem" (Douay version). As regards others, after Anselm, who used the mother-imagery, see Benedicta Ward, ed. and trans., *The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 67.

48. Matt. 23:37: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered together thy children, as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldst not? " (Douay version). In his prayer Anselm alludes to this verse.

49. Job 17:14.

50. Martin Rule, *The Life and Times of St. Anselm*, two vols. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co., 1883).

51. Rule, *op. cit*., Vol. I, pp. 104-105. My italics.

52. Rule, Vol. I, pp. 115-116.

53. *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 240. N. B. Collingwood's fuller statement: "The act of interpolation . . . is in no way arbitrary or merely fanciful: it is necessary or, in Kantian language, *a priori*. If we filled up the narrative of Caesar's doings with fanciful details such as the names of the persons he met on the way, and what he said to them, the construction would be arbitrary: it would be in fact the kind of construction which is done by an historical novelist. But if our construction involves *nothing that is not necessitated by the evidence*, it is a legitimate historical construction of a kind without which there can be no history at all" (pp. 240-241, italics mine).

54. Rule, Vol. I, p. 213.

55. Feuer, p. 259. Feuer quotes Martin Rule, *The Life and Times of St. Anselm*, pp. 57-58. I should think that a more plausible case could be made for inferring that Anselm's chief joy was understanding. See, for example, CDH II, 15 (S II, 116: 11-12) and Ep. 136 (S III, 280:34 – 281:41). Also note DCD 3 (S I, 237:7).

56. Rule, Vol. I, pp. 57-58. Italics mine.

57. Eadmer: "He gradually turned from study, which had formerly been his chief occupation, and began to give himself up to youthful amusements. His love and reverence for his mother held him back to some extent from these paths, but she died and then the ship of his heart had as it were lost its anchor and drifted almost entirely among the waves of the world." See Eadmer, *The Life of St Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury*. Ed. and trans. R. W. Southern (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), p. 6.

58. Eadmer, *op. cit*., pp. 4-5.

59. Rule, *op. cit*., Vol. I, pp. 13-14.

60. I. e., Anselm's father.

61. Feuer, p. 260.

62. Feuer, p. 271.

63. E.g., A. Nemetz writes: "St. Anselm did not intend to make a formal proof for the existence of God. He was not concerned with making a scientific demonstration for the existence of a necessary being, or for the possibility of a necessary being, or for the non-contradictoriness of the existence of a necessary being. Instead, St. Anselm intended his argument to exemplify a method through which the understanding can find an expression for the certitude of faith or through which reason can find a way to articulate the 'reasonable solidity of Truth.' From this perspective the argument can be regarded as valid." *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), Vol. X, p. 701 ("Ontological Argument").