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HERMENEUTICAL AND TEXTUAL PROBLEMS
IN THE COMPLETE TREATISES
OF ST. ANSELM

by

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PREFACE

Unlike *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm*,[1] which is addressed to the non-specialist, the present book is intended for the advanced scholar. Though its scope encompasses the entirety of Anselm's Complete Treatises, its primary focus is upon the *Monologion* and the *Proslogion*. These two treatises, perhaps better than any of the others except the *De Grammatico*, illustrate the complicated relationship between text, translation, and interpretation.

I have seen the claim that Anselm's "ideas and language are clear and simple; the difficulty lies in comprehending the ideas expressed."[2] Now, this is a claim which I do not readily understand. For I do not know what is supposed to be involved in the distinction between Anselm's *ideas* and his *ideas expressed*. Indeed, the only way we have of ascertaining Anselm's ideas is through the ideas expressed. So if the latter are difficult to comprehend, then so too are the former—unless the language in which the ideas are expressed poses special problems by not being clear and simple. That is, if both the ideas and the language are clear and simple, then the ideas expressed cannot be any more difficult to comprehend than are the ideas themselves. In short, the foregoing claim seems itself to be either unclear or incoherent. Let us assume that it is unclear. Then, perhaps what the author is aiming to say is something like the following: "Anselm's meaning is clear enough; the problem comes in evaluating the truth of what is meant." Or: "Anselm's statements are uncomplicated[3] and lucid; the difficulty lies in comprehending their implications." Yet, neither of these claims would be correct. For even apart from the question of implication or of truth-value, Anselm's *meaning* is not always clear—as evidenced starkly (though not exclusively) by *Monologion* 1-4 and *Proslogion* 2-4. What does he mean by " greater"? What is it for something to exist in the understanding? What exactly is meant by thinking the word

which signifies the object? What is meant (in the preface to the *Monologion*) by meditating *de divinitatis essentia*? How are we to construe "*Idem namque naturam hic intelligo quod essentiam*" (in *Monologion* 4)? What is meant by "*unum argumentum*" (in the preface to the *Proslogion*) or by "*prolatio*" (in *Reply to Gaunilo* 10)?

The present study seeks to illustrate the difficulty of grasping some of Anselm's ideas. And it purports to show how his simple language is not always clear and how some of his clear ideas are not really simple. In fact, if there is one irony about Anselm's writings, it is the irony that some of his ideas are unclear precisely because his language is too simple, and thus too imprecise, too empty of distinctions. The difficulty of understanding *Monologion* 1-4 arises out of such imprecisions. Accordingly, in the translation of *Monologion* 1-4 there is a risk involved in veering away from Anselm's very sentence--structure, as well as a counter-risk of promulgating opacity by means of a too strictly word-for-word or construction-for-construction rendition. In the revised translation hereto appended,[4] I have tried to steer more deftly between Scylla and Charybdis. This revision reflects a better—or at least a different—understanding of certain aspects of these chapters.

In enjoining vigorous debate with a number of Anselm scholars, I have frequently taken exception to their interpretations. But I remind the reader (1) that I have criticized the views only of those whom I respect, (2) that I have also criticized some of my own earlier interpretations and translations, and (3) that my criticisms are themselves open to debate.

Chapter IV was originally published as an article[5] in *Analecta Anselmiana* V and is reprinted here, with minor modifications, by permission of Minerva GmbH. I wrote this chapter in the spring of 1973; and I revised it during the ensuing autumn, while spending a sabbatical year in Paris as a fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies. Many of the ideas for the present study date from that time. I therefore express my continuing gratitude to both the ACLS and the University of Minnesota.

The appended bibliography supplements and updates the one which appeared in my earlier study of St. Anselm. Taken to-

gether, these bibliographies are extensive, though by no means exhaustive.

The hermeneutical and textual problems which inhere in the writings of St. Anselm have their counterparts in the works of all other medieval Latin authors. The present study is therefore paradigmatic of the difficulties faced by every philosopher, theologian, and historian who must cope with medieval texts. These difficulties—which often go unheralded—testify to the truth of R. G. Collingwood's verdict[6] that the re-enactment of past thought and the evaluation of that thought must occur simultaneously.

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CHAPTER I

ON TRANSLATING ANSELM'S COMPLETE TREATISES

Now that new translations of St. Anselm's Complete Treatises have just been published in a single edition of three volumes,[1] the time is perhaps fitting for the translators to call attention to some special problems attendant upon such an enterprise. For by becoming aware of these problems, a student of St. Anselm's systematic works will more readily discern the interrelationship between interpretation and translation. Indeed, he will recognize why translations cannot be completely free of interpretation and why he must guard against uncritical reliance upon any of them—the above-mentioned ones included.

I. Unlike St. Thomas Aquinas, Anselm neither develops nor works with a technical vocabulary of philosophical and theological expressions. Even though he is called the Father of Scholasticism, he is called this not in view of any "rigid" or "artificial" terminology but in view of his *sola ratione* methodology. The absence of a body of expressions which are used with more or less fixed significations creates the impression that Anselm's Latin is easier to deal with than is Thomas's. But, as a matter of fact, the looseness of Anselm's use of terms contributes immensely to the difficulty of comprehending his thought. Oftentimes, it is vexing to try to determine whether he is making a distinction or is simply employing another word in order to avoid monotony. For instance, when he switches from "*intelligi*" to "*cogitari*" in *Proslogion* 9 (S I, 108:12-13), he is obviously doing so to avoid repetition. And obviously in his *Reply to Gaunilo* 4 he is making a distinction between *non esse nequit cogitari* and *non esse nequit intelligi*. But what about the use of "*cogitare*" and "*intelligere*" at S I, 130:12-18 and S I, 139:1 (i.e., toward the beginning of *Reply to Gaunilo* 1 and 10 respectively)?

Admittedly, it makes no difference to Anselm whether he says "*intellectu dissolvi potest*" or "*cogitatione dissolvi potest*,"[2] whether he writes "*ille quod patri placiturum intellexit*" or "[*ille*] *hoc quod patri placiturum scivit*."[3] At times "*intelligere*" is best translated as "to understand," at times as "to judge,"[4] "to think,"[5] "to take to be the case,"[6] "to know,"[7] "to include,"[8] "to be plausible."[9] Similarly, in certain places "*intellectus*" is best construed as "understanding"; in other places it is more suitably rendered as " meaning,"[10] interpretation,"[11] "accurate account,"[12] "intelligence,"[13] "intellect." Finally, "*constituere intellectum*" can be translated as "to signify";[14] and "*in nullo intellectu*" often means "in no respect,"[15] rather than "in no intellect." Anselm's flexible use of "*intelligere*" and "*intellectus*" makes a translator almost totally dependent upon the context in order to determine how narrowly or broadly the term is being employed. For Anselm does not fix upon a "standard" use which exhibits a "standard" meaning, from which occasionally to deviate.

Other examples of fluid terminology abound. In *De Grammatico* he interchanges synonymously "*in sensu*," "*in intellectu*," and "*in sententia*."[16] In *De Concordia* he acknowledges that *spiritus* may acceptably be called *mens* or *ratio*.[17] To signify existing, he uses "*esse*," "*existere*," "*haberi*,"[18] "*subsistere*,"[19] "*habere essentiam*,"[20] "*consistere*,"[21] and "*esse in re*."[22] It would be misleading to translate "*subsistere*" as "to subsist"—thereby suggesting that Anselm was distinguishing subsisting from existing.[23] Moreover, depending upon the context, "*Filius de patre essentiam habet*" may be rendered either as "The Son has His essence from the Father" or as "The Son has His existence from the Father." For Anselm makes no precise distinction between *essentia* and *existentia*. At *Monologion* 62 (S I, 72:17) "*cogitare*" may be rendered as "to perceive," and at *Cur Deus Homo* I, 19 (S II, 85:10) as "to imagine." At *De Veritate* 8 (S I, 186:31), "*concipitur*" should be translated not as "is conceived" but as "is committed"; whereas at *Cur Deus Homo* II, 19 (S II, 131:4) "*concipio*" means "I receive." Furthermore, Anselm makes no systematic distinction between the meanings of "*potestas*," "*possibilitas*," and "*potentia*." And he interchanges[24] "*oratio*," "*propositio*," and "*enuntiatio*"—

all in the sense of "statement"—even though elsewhere[25] he employs "*oratio*" in the sense of "a phrase."

In short, Anselm's lack of a technical philosophical or theological vocabulary sometimes makes his thoughts difficult to grasp. A final example will suffice to illustrate this point concisely. The word "*argumentum*" can be used to mean either argument or premise. And, indeed, Anselm does use it in both these senses.[26] But when in the *Proslogion* Preface he speaks of propounding *unum argumentum*, does he mean that he has found a single argument-form which suffices to prove that God exists and is whatever we believe about the Divine Substance? Or does he mean he has found a single premise?: viz., the premise "God is something than which nothing greater can be thought." That is, does "*argumentum*" substitute here for "*ratio*" and "*probatio*" or for "*praemissum*" and "*prolatio*" ("utterance")? Only an examination of the entire work, as well as a comparison with the *Monologion* and the *Debate with Gaunilo*, can help one reach a judgment about the matter. But, in last analysis, whichever translation one chooses for "*unum argumentum*" will be a matter of interpretation. Thus, Richard R. La Croix[27] opts for the reading "a single argument" or "a single argument-form." And he accepts Charlesworth's translation of "*prolatio*" (in the second sentence of *Reply to Gaunilo* 10) as "proof." Interestingly, La Croix comes to believe that Anselm's argument-form can be correctly identified only by reference to the *Reply to Gaunilo*; for the *Reply* completes the "incomplete" proof found in *Proslogion* 2 and 3. By contrast, one can maintain (over against La Croix) that Anselm's statements in *Proslogion* 2 do constitute a complete proof without recourse to the *Reply to Gaunilo*, and that what Anselm attempted to undertake in the *Proslogion* was to show how a single consideration (*unum argumentum*) involves a single line of reasoning (*unum argumentum*). This single line of reasoning has different stages to it. The first stage attempts to demonstrate the existence of that being—assumed to be God—than which nothing greater can be thought (Chapter 2). The second stage shows that this being exists so really that it cannot even be thought not to exist (Chapter 3). The third stage purports to establish that this being has the other attributes (omnipotence, eternity, etc.) which are traditionally ascribed to God. On this

reading, Anselm actually has a number of arguments in the *Proslogion*; and in the *Reply* he produces new arguments and argument-forms. In last analysis, this dispute over how to translate "*argumentum*" and "*prolatio*" illustrates how translation and interpretation do proceed—and must proceed—*pari passu*.

2. Just as the lack of a technical vocabulary makes it difficult to understand and to translate Anselm's expressed thoughts, so too Latin's lack of definite and indefinite articles conduces to the same difficulty. However, we must be careful in locating the exact source of trouble. Some philosophers suppose that the absence of these articles not only makes various perplexities inevitable but that it also absolutely prevents certain puzzles from arising. For instance, in *Reference and Generality*[28] Peter Geach contends that Latin thinkers *could not* have had a theory of definite descriptions:

> The lack of an indefinite article in Latin did not prevent the development of a theory remarkably similar to the theory expounded in Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* about 'denoting' phrases of the form 'an A'. The lack of a definite article, on the other hand, means that no 'theory of definite descriptions' may be looked for in medieval writers.

Nonetheless there is no basis to this claim.[29] For, like all Latin writers, Anselm had substitute-ways of expressing what in English is expressible by the use of articles. Thus, in *De Grammatico* 13 (S I, 157:30) Anselm writes:

> *Ponamus quod sit aliquod animal rationale—non tamen homo—quod ita sciat grammaticam sicut homo*. ("Let us suppose there is some rational animal—other than man—which has expertise-in-grammar, even as does a man." Or: "Let us suppose there is a rational animal ….")

And three lines later he infers:

> *Est igitur aliquis non-homo sciens grammaticam*. ("Therefore, there is something which is not a man but which has expertise-in-grammar." Or: "Therefore, there is a non-human being which has expertise-in-grammar.")

This use of "*aliquis*" to express what in English would be expressed by the article "a" is typical of virtually all medieval writers. Another Latin word which plays the same role as does the indefinite article is "*quidam*" and its variants. Thus, in *De Grammatico* 9 (S I, 154:4-5) Anselm writes:

> *Aristoteles dicit et quendam hominem, et hominem et animal grammaticum.* ("Aristotle says that a man and *man* and *animal* are expert[s]-in-grammar.")

Regarding his knowledge of Aristotle, Anselm is relying upon Boethius' translation of the *Categories*. And frequently Boethius used both "*aliquis*" and "*quidam*" to translate the indefinite τὶς.

Similarly, Anselm has substitute-words for the definite article which Latin lacks. One of these substitutes is the demonstrative pronoun; another is the intensive adjective. Thus, in *De Libertate* 6 (S I, 217:25) he writes: "*Sed ipsa tentatio sua vi cogit eam velle quod suggerit*." ("But the temptation by its own force compels the will to will what it is suggesting.") And in *Cur Deus Homo* II, 16 (S II, 119:28-30) he says: "*Virgo autem illa de qua homo ille assumptus est, de quo loquimur, fuit de illis qui ante nativitatem eius per eum mundati sunt a peccatis, et in eius ipsa munditia de illa assumptus est.*" ("But the virgin from whom that man (of whom we are speaking) was taken belonged to the class of those who through Him were cleansed from their sins before His birth; and He was taken from her in her purity.") Accordingly, even though it may have been unlikely, there is in principle no reason why Anselm or another of the medieval philosophers could not have raised certain puzzles about definite descriptions, since they had expressions which were equivalent to what we call definite descriptions. Indeed, the expression "*id quo maius cogitari nequit*"[30] is tantamount to the definite description: "The being than which a greater cannot be thought."

The trouble-point for understanding Anselm does not occur because he *did not have* a way of saying clearly what can be said in English using the definite or the indefinite article; rather it occurs because he *did not use* these substitute expressions when they were required to disambiguate his Latin sentence. There is no better instance of this than the title of his major work: "*Cur Deus Homo*." Unquestionably, this title is excerpted from three fuller expressions in the text itself: (1) "*Deus homo factus est*," (2) *Deus se facit hominem*, " and (3) "*deum fieri hominem*."[31] And these fuller expressions are alternatives to the expression "*Deus incarnatus est*" (or "*Deus incarnatus factus est*"). In fact, in *De Conceptu Virginali* 17 (S II, 158: 10-11 & 14-17) Anselm poses the question "*Cur necesse fuit deum incarnari*?" and answers it with the words "*Ideo deus factus est homo, quia non sufficeret ad redimendos alios . . . homo non-deus*."[32] Now, as Anselm's theory of incarnation teaches, the Son of God became the man Jesus by assuming *a* human nature. That is, *De Incar-*

natione Verbi 11 (S II, 29:26 – 30:6) shows clearly that, on Anselm's view, the Son of God did not assume human nature as such—i.e., unindividuated human nature. Accordingly, he was not Man (not even the God-Man) but was a man (viz., the God-man). Hence, the appropriate translation of "*Cur Deus Homo*" is "Why God became a man"* rather than "Why God became man." This difference of translation is important. For too often in the past the statement "God assumed human nature" or "God became man" has fostered the mistaken impression that, for Anselm, Jesus assumed universal human nature, so that when *He* paid the debt of Adam's sin, *man* (or human nature as such) made this payment. But, in fact, Anselm's view is that *a* man paid this debt—doing so on behalf of all other men.

If the foregoing fact were not already clear by inference from *De Incarnatione Verbi* 11, it would be clear from the following consideration. If it were the case that through Jesus, man (*homo*) made payment for his sins, then it would be the case that through Jesus human nature (*homo*) made this payment. But human nature was unable to make the payment, even though it ought to have made payment because it was obligated to do so—obligated both in Adam, after the Fall, and in Adam's natural descendants. But in Jesus, human nature was sinless and thus was free of the obligation which resulted from Adam's sin. Hence, Jesus's human nature was, in one sense, not Adam's nature, even though in another sense it was. It was not *numerically* the same as Adam's nature, for otherwise it too would have been guilty. On the other hand, it was of the same species as Adam's nature, because it was derived from Mary, who was descended from Adam. Now, of itself, even Jesus' sinless, individuated human nature was unable to make satisfaction for the sin of the human race (i.e., for Adamic nature, generically speaking). For with respect solely to His human nature Jesus did not have anything which in value exceeded everything other than God. And such was the payment necessary as satisfaction.[33] Therefore, it was not Jesus' human nature which, of itself, made satisfaction; it was rather His divine person. (For it was His divine person which was more valuable than all of creation.) This is what Anselm means when he states:

> *Unde necesse erat, ut deus hominem assumeret in unitatem personae, quatenus qui in natura solvere debebat et non poterat, in persona esset qui*

* On-line addition: I now prefer the translation "Why God Became a [God-]man."

> *posset*. ("Hence, it was necessary for God to assume a human nature into a unity of person, so that the one who with respect to his nature ought to make payment, but was unable to, would be the one who with respect to his person was able to.")[34]

In other words, when the person Jesus performed a meritorious deed for the honor of God, He may be thought of as having paid with respect to His human nature that which was owed as a debt by every other human nature, though not by His own. Nonetheless, since His human nature was an Adamic human nature, it *ought* to have rendered a meritorious service to God in order to remove a disgrace from upon all human nature. His human nature ought to have done this because for it to do so was fitting, not because it was indebted to do so. Consequently, since a person does not exist apart from his nature: when the person of Jesus made payment, His human nature as well as His divine nature also made payment—making it on behalf of all other human natures (men). Thus, man made satisfaction only in the sense that a man made satisfaction on behalf of all other men.

In sum, *Cur Deus Homo* I, 8 (S II, 60:3-5) speaks of *illum hominem . . . quem filius se ipsum fecit*: that man . . . whom the Son caused Himself to become [viz., Jesus]. The appearance of the phrase "*illum hominem*" is meant to preclude the phrase "*quemlibet hominem*." (Note *De Incarnatione Verbi* 11. S II, 29:6-12.) Since Anselm's use of "*Filius se fecit illum hominem*" is but a consistent expansion and specification of what he meant by "*Deus se fecit hominem*," and since "*Cur deus se fecit hominem*" is but a consistent expansion of what he meant by the title "*Cur Deus Homo*," this title is more accurately rendered with the indefinite article than without it.

Assuredly, Anselm would have helped his interpreters had he entitled his work "*Cur Deus ille homo*," or even "*Cur Deus quidam homo*" or "*Cur Deus Jesus*" or "*Cur Deus incarnatus*." The fact that he did not employ any of these other titles means that his argument must be *understood* before the title of his treatise can be known to be translated accurately. ("*Qui non intellegit res, non potest ex verbis sensum elicere*" was Luther's way of putting the principle behind this point.) [35]

Anselm's refusal to deal explicitly with the problem of universals parallels his imprecise discourse about human nature. Thereby the translator is required to be a student of Anselm's

thought. For he is forced to translate Anselm's expressions in one of several ways—any one of which will convey an interpretation. Thus, it is unreasonable to demand that a translator not interpret; indeed, that would be tantamount to asking that he not translate. What must be demanded is rather the following: (1) that he not usurp the role of the exegete by leaning too far in the direction of making Anselm say things more precisely than Anselm in fact does; and (2) that he not saddle any one of Anselm's texts with so many ambiguities and inconsistencies that it becomes more incoherent than is warranted by a full comparison of all the texts.

Similar problems arise elsewhere in the *Cur Deus Homo* and *De Conceptu Virginali*. For instance, in *De Conceptu Virginali* 27 (S II, 170:13-14) Anselm states that *cum peccat persona quaelibet, peccat homo*. One translator has rendered this as: "When any person at all commits sin, man commits sin." And he appends a footnote explaining that Anselm is an ultra realist regarding the status of universals.[36] Yet, Anselm is not an ultra realist; nor is the translation correct. It is simply not the case that for Anselm there is numerically one universal human nature which all men share and which sins when any person sins. On the contrary. The more accurate reading is: "When any person sins, his human nature sins." Like many Latinists, Anselm did not always bother to insert possessive pronouns. In order to recognize that they are required, the translator must apprehend Anselm's position *in toto*. And to do so requires scrutinizing his complete treatises and formulating a framework in terms of which to elicit his meanings. Obviously, there will be reciprocity: The exegesis of particular passages will help determine the overall position; and the overall position will condition the exegesis of particular passages. Consequently, any student of St. Anselm's thoughts who does not read Latin must come to terms with the fact that in interpreting Anselm he is working from an English text which itself is already an interpretation.

At first, one might think it desirable to adopt the following rule: "If Anselm had an alternative way of saying something and did not say it that way, then he did not mean it that way." This rule might even be generalized: "If any author has a way of saying something and does not say it that way. . . ." Yet, no

matter what is supposed about the intrinsic plausibility of this rule, it is questionable whether it can be adopted even as a rule-of-thumb for understanding Anselm. Take, for instance, the single word "*aliud*." Frequently, Anselm and Gaunilo do not use this word even though they intend for the reader to supply it.[37] Normally, this omission is inconsequential. But in some cases a vast difference will result, depending upon whether the reader does or does not supply it. Suppose a reader were to construe Gaunilo's "*illud omnibus quae cogitari possint maius*"[38] as "that which is greater than all that can be thought," instead of as "that which is greater than all others that can be thought." And suppose he reasons: "Gaunilo could have included the word "*aliis*" had he wanted to. Therefore, its omission was deliberate. Therefore, as construed by Gaunilo the expression means that this being is inconceivable." Such reasoning would be naive precisely because it would not take account of the context of Gaunilo's argument. It would be as simplistic as would be the claim:

> Gaunilo writes "*insulam illam terris omnibus praestantiorem*." But he could have written "*insulam illam terris aliis omnibus praestantiorem*. " Therefore, he meant an island which is more excellent than all lands (including itself), rather than an island which is more excellent than all *other* lands.

Likewise, then, simply because Anselm writes "*Cum peccat persona quaelibet, peccat homo*" instead of writing "*Cum peccat persona quaelibet, peccat humana natura sua*," it does not necessarily follow that he did not mean the latter. Indeed, since we know from *De Incarnatione Verbi* 11 and elsewhere[39] that Anselm uses "*homo*" as a substitute for "*humana natura*," and since we are aware of his frequent omission of words like "*eius*," "*sui*," "*aliud*," we cannot determine the correct translation by appeal to the above-mentioned rule. Indeed, if there is any general rule of hermeneutics, it is simply that rules of interpretation must be *elicited* from the texts themselves. And it is easy to find an example of eliciting such a particular rule: In reading Anselm's texts we notice again and again cases of his substituting one word for another without a corresponding change of meaning. In *De Incarnatione Verbi* 2 (S II, 11: 10) he uses "*vox*" and "*nomen*" with the same meaning. In *Monologion* 38 (S I, 56:22-23) he interchanges "*significet*" and "*designet*" without any change of meaning. And in *De Concordia* III, 2 (S

II, 265:14-16) he substitutes "*rectitudinem servat*" for "*rectitudinem tenet*." After witnessing a large number of such examples, the reader begins to realize that Anselm is working with a rule of style which runs something like this: "Avoid repeating the same word in close succession." Having grasped Anselm's rule of style, a translator will not be misled into supposing that in *De Veritate* 2 the switch from "*enuntiatio*" to "*oratio*" is made in order to mark some important distinction between a statement and a sentence. Accordingly, he will translate both Latin words by the one English word "statement." Similarly, a passage such as

> *Communis terminus syllogismi non tam in prolatione quam in sententia est habendus. Sicut enim nihil efficitur, si communis est in voce et non in sensu: ita nihil obest, si est in intellectu et non in prolatione. Sententia quippe ligat syllogismum, non verba.*[40]

will be rendered as

> The common term of a syllogism must be common not so much in verbal form as in meaning. For just as no conclusion follows if it is common in verbal form but not in meaning, so no harm is done if it is common in meaning but not in verbal form. Indeed, the meaning—rather than the words—determines a syllogism.

instead of as

> It is not so much in the form of utterance as in its meaning that the common term of a syllogism is to be sought; for on the same grounds as those according to which no proof emerges from a mere verbal identity of terms without identical sense, there is nothing wrong with an identity which is understood although not made explicit. The meaning of the words is what really binds the syllogism together, and not just the words themselves.

3. A further set of problems is produced by certain of Anselm's Latin idioms. In particular, the expression "*verbum alicuius rei*" would ordinarily be rendered in English as "a word for some thing." But in the *Monologion* Anselm's argument trades upon a parallel between "*verbum rei*" and "*verbum spiritus summi.*"[41] As "the word of a thing" is not idiomatic English, so "the Word for the Supreme Spirit" distorts Anselm's meaning. Yet, to say asymmetrically "the word for a thing" and "the Word of the Supreme Spirit" fails to capture in English the parallel upon which Anselm is trading in Latin. Moreover, the translation "word for a thing" can also be misleading—for example, in the sentence which would read: "There can be no word for that

which neither was, is, nor will be."[42] But surely, someone might protest, the word "unicorn" is a word for something which never has existed and, presumably, never will exist. S. N. Deane deals with this problem by putting: "To what has not been, and is not, and will not be, there can be no word corresponding." And for "*verbum alicuius rei*" he writes "a word corresponding to some object." Yet, by the logic of Anselm's argument Deane is prevented from construing "*verbum spiritus summi*" as "Word corresponding to the Supreme Spirit." Moreover, since Anselm is talking about images—to which he gives the name "words"—the term "corresponding" is not the most felicitous one. For although images do correspond to things, "correspond" is both vague and artificial. Indeed, the expression "an image of a thing" is much more idiomatic than is the expression "an image corresponding to a thing."

In the light of the above considerations, the translation in the Complete Treatises makes use of the phrase "the word [or image] of a thing." This phrase has three advantages. First, it holds before the reader's mind the fact that Anselm is not talking about spoken words but about a special kind of word, viz., thoughts, memories, percepts, likenesses—all of which he calls images. Secondly, this phrase preserves the grammatical parallel with "*verbum spiritus summi*." Finally, in Anselm's argument this phrase seems more natural and less misleading than the others. Admittedly, there may be another equally acceptable way to solve the difficulties engendered by the Latin idiom "*verbum rei*" in *Monologion* 32-33 and 48. But whatever the way, it must be other than simply saying "the word of a thing," "the word for a thing," or "the word corresponding to a thing."

Conclusion. I have highlighted three problem-areas that trouble a translator of St. Anselm's treatises: (1) the lack of a technical vocabulary, (2) the omission of possessive adjectives and of words which substitute for definite or indefinite articles, and (3) the presence of idiomatic locutions not easily capturable in English. Along the way, I have cautioned against approaching the Latin texts with a set of pre-established exegetical rules. And I have illustrated how translation and interpretation are often inseparable.

In last analysis, the reader must not expect from the Complete

Treatises that which no lengthy translation can deliver *except* in principle: viz., a wholly perfect rendering. And he dare not demand what no lengthy translation can deliver *even* in principle: viz., a version free of all interpretation. That is to say, the Complete Treatises are *translations*, not some English substitute for the Latin text.

ABBREVIATIONS

Anselm's Works

M	*Monologion* (A Soliloquy)
P	*Proslogion* (An Address)
DG	*De Grammatico*
DV	*De Veritate* (On Truth)
DL	*De Libertate Arbitrii* (Freedom of Choice)
DCD	*De Casu Diaboli* (The Fall of the Devil)
DIV	*Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi* (The Incarnation of the Word)
CDH	*Cur Deus Homo* (Why God Became a [God]-man)
DCV	*De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato* (The Virgin Conception and Original Sin)
DP	*De Processione Spiritus Sancti* (The Procession of the Holy Spirit)
DC	*De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio* (The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice)
PF	*Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury* (Philosophical Fragments). Latin text ed. F. S. Schmitt and published in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie and Theologie des Mittelalters*, 33/3. (Münster: Aschendorff Press, 1936)

Other Works

DT	Augustine's *De Trinitate* (On the Trinity) E.g., DT 7.4.7 indicates Book 7, Chapter 4, Section 7
PL	*Patrologia Latina* (ed. J. P. Migne)
AA	*Analecta Anselmiana* (Frankfurt/M.: Minerva GmbH). Vol. I (1969); Vol. II (1970); Vol. III (1972); Vol. IV (1975); Vol. V (1976). Vols. I-III ed. F. S. Schmitt; Vols. IV-V ed. Helmut Kohlenberger. A continuing series.
S	*Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia*. Ed. F. S. Schmitt. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons). 6 Vols. (1946 – 1961). Vol. I first published in Seckau, 1938; Vol. II first published in Rome, 1940. All volumes reprinted by Friedrich Frommann Press (Stuttgart, 1968) with an introduction by Schmitt drawing together his articles on Anselm's text, and with corrigenda for the text.

NOTES

Preface

1. J. Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972). With regard to the present book, even the advanced scholar may prefer to bypass Section II of Chapter II, which is much too detailed to be interesting.

2. Benedicta Ward in *Speculum,* 49 (October 1974), 742-743.

3. By "simple" the author seems to mean "uncomplicated." Words such as these two are notoriously vague.

4. See Appendix I of the present volume.

5. AA V (1976), 25-53.

6. N.B. *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 217: "Comprehension and criticism, or understanding what the writer means and asking whether it is true, are distinct attitudes, but not separable. The attempt to comprehend without criticizing is in the last resort a refusal to share in one essential particular the experience of the writer; for he has written no single sentence, if he is worth reading, without asking himself 'is that true?', and this critical attitude to his own work is an essential element in the experience which we as his readers are trying to share. If we refuse to criticize, therefore, we are making it impossible for ourselves to comprehend."

See also J. Hopkins, "Bultmann on Collingwood's Philosophy of History," *Harvard Theological Review*, 58 (April 1965), 227-233.

Chapter I: On Translating Anselm's Complete Treatises

1. Toronto and New York: The Edwin Mellen Press. Vol. I, 1974; Vo1s. II & III, 1976.

2. See DIV 4 (S II, 18:3-5).

3. Cf. *Meditatio Redemptionis Humanae* 88:109-110 with 88:113-114. See DV 12 (S I, 193:23-24).

4. P 2 (S I, 101:12).

5. CDH II, 11 (S II, 111:5).

6. DP 2 (S II, 188:23).

7. DC III, 13 (S II, 286:4).

8. DP 9 (Cf. S II, 201:17 with 202:1).

9. CDH I, 18 (S II, 81:13): "*cum intelligi possit quia*" ("since it is plausible that").

10. M 19 (S I, 34:21); DC I, 2 (S II, 248:5); DV 8 (S I, 186:6).

11. DC III, 5 (S II, 270:2).

12. DC III, 5 (S II, 270:7).

13. *Reply to Gaunilo* 2 (S I, 132:13).

14. DG 14 (S I, 160:31)

15. Cf. *Reply to Gaunilo* 2 (S I, 132:29); DV 10 (S I, 190:26); DC III, 5 (S II, 270:5).

16. DG 4 (S I, 149:11-13).

17. DC III, 13 (S II, 286:11). Sometimes Anselm says "*mens humana*" (DIV 10. S II, 26:12), sometimes "*humanus intellectus*" (CDH II, 16. S II, 117:16), and "*humanus sensus*" (DCV 7. S II, 148:5).

18. DCD 1 (S I, 233:11).

19. CDH II, 16 (S II, 119:10. Cf. 119:8); DCV 23 (S II, 165:20).

20. DP 6 (S II, 197:11).

21. M 79 (S I, 86:8).

22. P 2 (S I, 101:17).

23. Likewise, much confusion has arisen over *On Behalf of the Fool* 5. For translators have failed to recognize that at S I, 128:9 "*constare*" means "to exist"—even though in the previous line "*constet*" means "it is evident."

24. In DV 2.

25. DG 21 (S I, 167:18).

26. Cf. DG 21 (S I, 168:10-11) with DP 1 (S II, 177:16), where "*argumenta*" is used in the sense of arguments and of premises, respectively. Cf. S I, 93:6-8 with S I, 135:18-20, where in both cases the sense seems to be the same.

27. *Proslogion II and III: A Third Interpretation of Anselm's Argument* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972).

28. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962, p. ix.

29. Cf. Michael Loux's statement: "Since Latin lacks the definite article, Ockham does not consider the case of definite descriptions." *Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), p. 46, n. 14.

30. P 2 (S I, 101:15-16). Note the last few speeches of *De Veritate* 12, where Anselm illustrates how in Latin the perfect passive participle may be used as a substitute for the present passive participle, which Latin lacks, and how the present active participle may be used as a substitute for the perfect active participle, which Latin also lacks.

31. Note CDH I, 1 (S II, 48:2-3); I, 8 (S II, 60:3-4); II, 16 (S II,118:1-2); II, 16 (S II, 121:3, 9); II, 17 (S II, 124:7); II, 17 (S II, 125:25); II, 18 (S II, 126:25); II, 19 (S II, 130:29-30); II, 22 (S II, 133:6). See p. 200, n. 38 below.

32. Also cf. S II, 105:3-4 with 105:12-14 (in CDH II, 9). Note Augustine's expressions in *On the Trinity*: (1) "V*erbum Dei dico carnem factum, id est, hominem factum* …" (4.2.31. PL 42:910); (2) "*Christus . . . factus est homo*" (7.3.4. PL 42:937). Also note 8.5.7. (PL 42:952).

33. See CDH I, 21.

34. CDH II, 18 (S II, 127:2-5).

35. Quoted from E. D. Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), fifth printing (1974), p. 248.

36. See Anselm of Canterbury. *Why God Became Man and The Virgin*

Conception and Original Sin. Trans. and intro. Joseph M. Colleran (Albany: Magi Books, 1969), p. 208.

37. E.g., cf. M 64 (S I, 75:7) with M 65 (S I, 76:3), and DCD 4 (S I, 241:31 with DCD 4 (S I, 242:1).

38. *On Behalf of the Fool* 4 (S I, 126:30).

39. Cf. S II, 102:25 with 102:26-27 (in CDH II, 8).

40. DG 4 (S I, 149:11-14).

41. See M 32, 33, and 48. In some cases there is a problem about how to capture in idiomatic English the sense of a single Latin word in its Anselmian context. The most striking example is the word "*grammaticus*."

42. See M 32 (S I, 50:20). Anselm's terminology comes from Augustine, who likewise calls an image of a thing *its word*: e.g., DT 8.6.9 (PL 42:955). See also 9.10.15 (PL 42:969).